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COMMENTS

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT*-PUNITIVE DAMAGES,
BAD FAITH BREACH OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT,
AND THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

When one analytically examines insurance, one is examining a system of risk spreading.' This system of risk spreading is reciprocal between insurer and insured. 2 The insured spreads the risk of injury or
death by purchasing insurance; likewise, the insurer spreads the risk of
insuring people by insuring categorically diverse insureds.' To hold that
insurance is necessary in society is an understatement.' We are a risk
conscious people and we spend billions of dollars every year on insurance. 5 Insurance companies are powerful entities in society. Thus, one
would expect that a comprehensive jurisprudence has been created for
monitoring the conduct of insurance companies.
It is clear that the law of contracts is once again being absorbed
into the law of torts.' This becomes evident upon inquiry into the various causes of action now available to insureds against their insurers. 7
Many jurisdictions have established a tort theory of recovery for insureds when their insurers breach an insurance contract.8 Bad faith
* F. DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (C. Garnet trans. 1959).
I. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK (1986). For a review of this book, see Book Review,
Distributing Risk, 73 VA. L. REV. 277 (1987).
2.

K. ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 2.

3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Note, The Availability of Excess Damagesfor Wrongful Refusal to Honor
First Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Emerging Trend]; Note, Ohio Recognizes Tort Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Between an Insurer and its Insured-Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 10 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 159 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Ohio].
5. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 1.
6. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1984).
7. Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 613, 616-17 (1979); Note, Ohio, supra note 4, at
162-63. See generally Note, Emerging Trend, supra note 4, at 167.
8. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967)
(emotional distress); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
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breach of an insurance contract is the most common cause of action
available to insureds.9 Accordingly, insurers may be held liable for punitive damages, since bad faith breach falls within the rubric of tort
law. 10 This is no exiguous matter, for the damages sought by insureds
are far greater than the damages that would otherwise be available
under the principles of contract law. 1
Throughout case law and commentary, there has been much controversy over punitive damages. 2 Often called an "anomaly" of tort

78 (1970) (emotional distress); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968) (fraud); see also J. McCarthy, Punitive Damages In Bad Faith Cases §
1.41 (3d ed. 1983).
9. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). In
bad faith litigation, there are two types of actions brought against an insurer: (1) third-party
claims and (2) first-party claims. The Ohio Supreme Court in Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6
Ohio St. 3d 272, 276, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (1983), has characterized third-party claims as
"refusal-to-settle claims," and first-party claims as "refusal-to-pay claims." Id. at 275, 452
N.E.2d at 1319. A first party claim is a claim which the insured makes upon his or her own
insurance company because of a personal loss. A third party claim is a claim based on the company's contractual obligation to protect its insured from liability to a third person for injury to
person or property. Third party claims include the duty to settle reasonable claims. Note, Ohio
supra note 4, at 163 n.44.
One commentator notes that courts originally analogized recoveries against insurers to establish theories in the law, such as fraud, etc. Accordingly, the author claims it was the limitations of
these established theories which prompted the creation of a cause of action for bad faith breach.
K. ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 183.
Although varied configurations of the elements of bad faith breach could be set forth, the
basic elements are: (1) the insurer's legal duty to act in good faith and (2) the insurer's breach of
this duty. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 2d at 276-77, 452 N.E.2d at 1319-20.
10. Note, Ohio, supra note 4, at 167. It should be noted that conduct which may constitute
bad faith breach may not necessarily warrant the imposition of punitive damages. Citing authority
from other jurisdictions, the Ohio Supreme Court in Hoskins distinguished an insurer's conduct
which establishes a lack of good faith from conduct which warrants the imposition of punitive
damages. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 2d at 277-78, 452 N.E.2d at 1321.
I1. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) ($125
million punitive damages award, before remittitur). "One factor to consider in evaluating an
award of punitive damages is the particular nature of the defendant's acts in light of the whole
record; in general, the more reprehensible the act, the greater the appropriate punishment, assuming all other factors are equal." Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. App. 3d 610,
637, 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 905 (1984) ($2.5 million punitive damages); see also Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 318 (R.I. 1980); Levine, supra note 7, at 616-18; Note, Ohio, supra
note 4, at 161-62. In contract actions, the party in breach will usually be liable for expectancy
damages. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1146-47
(1970).
12. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case For Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69
VA. L. REV. 269, 269 n.1 (1983). There has been an overwhelming amount of commentary against
the propriety of punitive damages. Very little commentary exists in support of punitive damages.
The following articles lend insight into the worth of punitive damages and the admonitory function of torts: Levine, supra note 7; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled
Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1173 (1931); Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1980).
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law, punitive damages are seen as recovery beyond the propriety of tort
law's alleged traditional function-compensation." Many courts and
commentators view punitive damages as punishment that is similar to
the penalties imposed by criminal law. 4 Indeed, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,15 Justice Powell expressed disapproval over the unlimited
discretion juries have in awarding punitive damages. 6 Justice Powell
stated that punitive damages "are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." 7
Yet a number of commentators maintain that punitive damages
are consistent with tort law, reasoning that the criticism of punitive
damages is due to confusion over the essence of tort law.'" Some jurisdictions, moreover, do not see this affinity between punitive damages
and punishment at all. These jurisdictions recognize punitive damages
as compensation.' 9 In Wise v. Daniel,20 for example, the defendant shot
the plaintiff, the conductor of an interurban car, because of an argument over why the car had not stopped to pick up the defendant. 2' On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan commented on the purpose of
punitive damages." The court explained that when a defendant injures

13. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 9 (5th ed. 1984); Morris,
supra note 12, at 1176-77; Note, supra note 12, at 306-31.
14. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139
(1980); Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 644-45; Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 85 MICH. L. REV. 1699,
1703-05 (1987). Dean Prosser has written:
The idea of punishment, or of discouraging other offenses, usually does not enter into tort
law, except in so far as it may lead the courts to weigh the scales somewhat in favor of the
plaintiff's interests in determining that a tort has been committed in the first place. In one
rather anomalous respect, however, the ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the
field of torts. Where the defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and
has the character of outrage ...

courts have permitted the jury to award

.

'punitive' or

'exemplary' damages, or what is sometimes called 'smart
money.'
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 9.
15. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
16. Id. at 350.
17. Id.
18. Note, supra note 12, at 305. See generally note 12 and accompanying text.
19. One commentator has identified four jurisdictions in which punitive damages are similar
to compensation: Connecticut, Iowa, Michigan, and New Hampshire. Comment, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart out of "Smart Money," 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
979, 988 n.3 (1986). Forty-seven states allow punitive damages. Only Nebraska, New Hampshire
and Washington prohibit punitive damage awards. R. SCHLOERB, R. BLATT, R. HAMMESFAHR & L.
NUGENT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15 (1988). For an outline of each state's position
as to the purpose
of punitive damages see 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES L. AND PRAC. 21-25
(1985 & Supp. 1989).
20. 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922).
21. Id. at 230-31, 190 N.W. at 746-47.
22. Id. at 233, 190 N.W. at 747.

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:3

a plaintiff with spite, venom, or maliciousness, this should be considered by the jury in compensating the plaintiff."
It is at this point that the constitutional issues surrounding punitive damages arise. The United States Supreme Court in Aetna Life
Insurance v. Lavoie24 was presented with a first-party bad faith action
against an insurer. 5 A jury awarded the insureds $3.5 million in punitive damages at the state court level.26 The Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed the award." Subsequently, however, the insured learned that
Justice Embry, of the Alabama Supreme Court, had also filed bad
faith actions in the lower courts of Alabama. 8 Among the issues before
the Court in Aetna Life were various constitutional attacks upon the
$3.5 million punitive damages award.2 9 The Court, however, chose not
to rule on the constitutional issues, deciding the case upon Justice Embry's failure to disqualify himself from the action.3 0 The Supreme
Court, nevertheless, foreshadowed that "[tihese arguments raise important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved."'"
Finally, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.,3 2 the Supreme Court addressed the question whether
punitive damages fall within the ambit of the excessive fines clause of
the eighth amendment.33 In that case, which involved federal antitrust
and state tort law, the Court held that the excessive fines clause does
not apply to an award of punitive damages in civil actions between pri3
vate parties.
This comment will initially examine the purpose and nature of pu-

23. Id. at 234, 190 N.W. at 747 (emphasis added).
24. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
25. Id. at 815-30.
26. Id. at 816.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 817.
29. Id. at 822-24.
30. Id. at 828.
31. Id. at 828-29. Recently, the United States Supreme Court again refused to reach the
constitutional issues raised in regard to a bad faith action where punitive damages were awarded.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645 (interim ed. 1988). In a concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor stated:
Mississippi law gives juries discretion to award any amount of punitive damages in any tort
case in which a defendant acts with a certain mental state. In my view, because of the
punitive character of such awards, there is reason to think that this may violate the Due
Process Clause . . . .[T]he Court should scrutinize carefully the procedures under which
punitive damages are awarded in civil lawsuits.
Id. at 1655 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (interim ed. 1989).
33. Id. at 2913.
34. Id. "We therefore hold, on the basis of the history and purpose of the Eighth Amendment, that its Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases
between private parties." Id. at 2912.
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nitive damages. Then, it will analyze the utility of punitive damages in
the context of bad faith breach. Finally, this comment will discuss the
applicability of the excessive fines clause to punitive damage awards in
civil cases between private parties.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The History of and Reaction to Punitive Damages

Two theories have been proposed to explain the growth of punitive
damages in our legal system.3 5 One theory postulates that punitive
damages were created because appellate courts were apprehensive
about granting a new trial when a jury returned a large damage
award.3 6 Historically, jurors were chosen because of their knowledge of
the parties in the dispute; hence, they were often intimately familiar
with the parties' financial circumstances.3 7 Because appellate courts
lacked precise standards for computing compensatory damages, juries
were often in a better position to assess damages.3" As time passed,
fairly accurate methods for calculating compensatory damages
emerged.3 9 But courts were still apprehensive about upsetting large
damage awards when the defendant's conduct was flagrant." Thus, in
response to this apprehension, punitive damages emerged. 1
A second theory proposes that punitive damages were developed to
compensate for harm which historically was not compensable, such as
emotional distress.4 ' Thus, courts utilized punitive damages as a justification for awards in excess of actual damages.4 3 When these harms
35. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 642. Often cited as the first case recognizing punitive damages is Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). For a more indepth history of punitive damages, see 9 H. McGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES § 300-25
(13th ed. 1972). The concept of punitive damages has been said to date as far back as 2000 B.C.
in The Code of Hammurabi. Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective. 14 TRIAL 50
(Nov. 1978). See also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 642 n.19. The historical foundation
for modern punitive damage awards is evident in the second book of Moses, Exodus. There the
following passages are found:
If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he shall restore five oxen for an
ox, and four sheep for a sheep ....
For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for
ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to
be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall
condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbor.
Exodus 22:1, 22:9 (King James).
36. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 642-43.
37. Id. at 643.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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became compensable, this theory argues, punishment and deterrence
became the rationalization for punitive damages.""
Albeit in dictum, the United States Supreme Court in Day v.
Woodworth, 45 accepted punitive damages as an unquestionable part of
our jurisprudence. 46 Years later, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged, in
his dissent in Smith v. Wade,47 that in our jurisprudence damages
should "compensate" an injured party and that damages relieve detriment "actually" endured by the injured party.48 Justice Rehnquist believed that punitive damages, which far exceed ordinary compensation,
are an anomaly for which no rationalization will suffice.49 In a similar
vein, Judge Foster in Fay v. Parker,50 described punitive damages as "a
monstrous heresy . . . an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." 5 1 Other writers, though
perhaps not so vividly, have taken a different approach to punitive
damages. They have heralded the deterrent nature of punitive damages
as essential in a complex society.52 Dean Prosser explained that since
the purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter, they are
anomalous to tort law.5" Dean Prosser recognized, however, that punitive damages are "an established part of our legal system."'54 If "established part of our legal system" means that punitive damages have "existed for a long time," then Dean Prosser's observation is accurate. 55
But if "established part of our legal system" means "accepted part of
our legal system," then quite the opposite is true. Our legal system,
which includes courts, legislatures, and commentators, has not accepted
punitive damages with anything but debate, controversy, and

44. Id.
45. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
46. Id. at 371. On numerous occasions the United State Supreme Court has relied upon
Day. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 159 (1967); Scott v. Donald. 165
U.S. 58, 87-89 (1897); Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875); Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 213-14 (1858).
47. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
48. Id. at 57.
49. Id. at 58.
50. 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
51. Id. at 382.
52. Levine, supra note 7, at 638; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 670; Note, supra
note 12, at 306-31. Commentator Levine has recognized that punitive damages are mandated
when considering the reprehensible conduct of insurers. "The marked lack of social or moral concern which has too frequently characterized insurance claims practices demands that the deterrent
effect of exemplary damages verdicts in bad faith actions be preserved." Levine, supra note 7, at
638.
53. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 13, at 12.
54. Id.
55. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 642 n.19.
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confusion.5
B.

The Purpose and Nature of Punitive Damages

Professor Morris' timeless article on punitive damages identifies
two functions that are inherent in tort law-reparation and admonition. 7 Reparation is synonymous with compensation. 8 "[It preserves
economic stability by providing money substitutes for losses." 59 Few
commentators disagree over the existence of the reparative function.
The admonitory function of tort law, however, is not easily defined
or understood. Professor Morris reasoned that if the court orders
money taken away from the defendant, then it must have sound justification for doing so. 6 0 Liability, according to Professor Morris, is often
hinged upon the nature of the defendant's conduct."1 The condition precedent before liability will attach is the defendant's fault.6 2 When referring to fault, Professor Morris is describing conduct that, from a
social perspective, is unacceptable. 63 Focusing on the nature of the defendant's conduct might dissuade the defendant from repeating his conduct and warn others who may do the same.' This is the admonitory
function of tort law:
Why this requirement [of fault]? It is possible that a judgement against
a defendant which is based on his 'fault' might discourage a repetition
of his wrongful conduct and serve as a warning to others who are inclined to commit similar wrongs. So, in the liability with fault cases
there is an admonitory function as well as a reparative function.6 5
Professor Morris believed that the admonitory function was inherent in tort law. 6 Indeed, to a certain extent compensatory damages
attempt to effectuate the admonitory function. 7 But compensatory
damages may not suffice when severe admonition is required. Hence,
punitive damages serve to expand the narrow admonitory effect of compensatory damages.68 "Punitive damages are ordinarily merely a means
56. One student commentator has theorized that our system of jurisprudence has never integrated punitive damages into the law of torts. Note, supra note 12, at 303.
57. Morris, supra note 12, at 1173-74.
58. Id. at 1173.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 1174.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1173 n.j.
63. Id. at 1174 n.7.
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 1177.
67. See Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
68. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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of increasing the severity of the admonition of 'compensatory' damages
... ,,69 Professor Morris viewed punitive damages as a means by
70
which the admonitory function of tort law could be fulfilled. In essence,1 Professor Morris regarded punitive damages as an effective
7
tool.
Because the admonitory function is inherent in tort law, it is fre73
quently not expressed in cases. 72 Levine v.Knowles and Richards Co.
v. Harrison74 are two cases that do recognize the admonitory function
of tort law. In Levine, defendant Knowles, a veterinarian, informed

69. See Morris, supra note 12, at 1177.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 669.
72. In Fisher v. City of Miami, 160 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. dismissed, 172 So. 2d 455 (1965) the District Court of Appeals of Florida held that a municipal
corporation could not be held liable for punitive damages, for to do so would not serve the admonitory function. The Fisher Court cited Professor Morris. Id. at 59 n.l.In this regard Professor
Morris wrote:
The money in the treasury is derived from the pockets of taxpayers who have comparatively little to say about the actual management of the corporation's business. It is not
likely that the political employee will be punished when the power of punishing him is in
the hands of his political patron, because of the outcome of a damage suit against the city.
Assessment of punitive damages against a city would probably impoverish the public treasury without serving the admonitory function.
Morris, supra note 12, at 1204.
In Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986), the plaintiffs
brought an action against asbestos companies, alleging injury due to exposure to asbestos. After
early dismissals of many defendants in this multi-party action, only the Johns-Manville and Bell
Asbestos Mines, Ltd. defendants remained. At the trial court level, the jury awarded plaintiffs
compensatory and punitive damages. Throughout the different stages of litigation in Fischer, it
was confirmed that Johns-Manville knew of the dangers associated with exposure to asbestos in
the early 1930's. Despite suggestions of an industry-wide effort to mitigate the risks of asbestos, it
became clear that Johns-Manville, as well as other asbestos companies, adopted a conscious policy
of keeping the dangers associated with asbestos products confidential. Id. at 647-51, 512 A.2d at
468-70. The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated: "Punitive damages .. .serve to express the
community's disapproval of outrageous conduct-the 'admonitory' function . . . . They are
awarded to punish the wrongdoer, and to deter both the wrongdoer and others from similar conduct in the future." Id. at 657, 512 A.2d at 473; see also Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell &
Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 51, 477 A.2d 1224, 1232 (1984) (the court recognized that where no compensable harm is done to plaintiff, but the conduct of defendant is reprehensible, admonition cannot
be effectuated without punitive damages, citing Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,
70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 529 (1957)).
In Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 672 (Iowa 1971), a dissenting judge stated: "The admonitory function of the tort law is adequately served where the compensatory damages claimed
are high and the granted award itself may act as a severe punishment and a deterrence." Id.
(Larson, J., dissenting). This statement is highly doubtful in the context of bad faith breach. In
fact the damages received, traditionally, would not deter the abuse of insureds. Insurers were
profiting from the limitations of contractual theories. That is, liability was limited to the face
value of the insurance contract. Only when punitive damages are imposed will insurers be adequately deterred.
73. 197 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
74. 262 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 165 (1972).
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Levine that "Tiki," Levine's dog, had died while receiving ordinary
care for a skin condition.7" Disturbed over this, Levine directed
Knowles to save Tiki's body for an autopsy.7" Nevertheless, Tiki's body
was cremated." Levine brought an action against Knowles, alleging
that Tiki's cremation was done "wilfully, wantonly, maliciously, and
with great indifference to the person, property or rights" of Levine.7"
The Levine court stated that compensatory damages are appropriate for the value of a dead dog, if the dog was improperly destroyed.79
But if the dog was destroyed by conduct exhibiting a wilful, wanton,
reckless, or malicious disregard of rights, then punitive damages may
be appropriate.8 0 Utilizing Professor Morris' reasoning, the court recognized that the admonitory qualities intrinsic in compensatory damages
are limited.8 1 Punitive damages "can only fulfill this [admonitory]
function when the sum required to repair the plaintiff's loss also happens to be an admonition of the proper severity." 2 The Court's reasoning implied that compensatory damages, if awarded, would not suffice
in admonishing the misconduct of Knowles. The court viewed punitive
damages as a tool for fulfilling the admonitory function of tort law. 3
Similarly, Richards Co., which relied on Levine, 4 demonstrates
the necessity of punitive damages in effectuating admonition. In Richards Co., the appellee, an eighteen year old minor, received intense
training in the art of selling door-to-door from the appellant, a multimillion dollar encyclopedia marketer. He was subsequently sent to Valdosta, Georgia, to solicit business, accompanied by a crew member of
Richards Company.8 5 In Valdosta, a municipal ordinance forbade solicitation within city limits unless the solicitor possessed a permit.8 6 Being
aware of the permit requirements, the crew manager attempted to arrive in Valdosta in time to register for permits.8 7 Arriving late and concluding that permits would be unavailable, the crew manager sent appellee to solicit business outside the city limits. 8 The crew manager,

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Levine, supra note 7, at 330.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Richards Co., 262 So. 2d at 263.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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however, failed to obtain a map of the city. 9 As a result, the appellee
was dropped off inside the city limits.90 The appellee was arrested for
soliciting without a permit and he spent the night in jail. 91 At trial, the
jury awarded the appellee compensatory and punitive damages.9
On appeal, the appellant argued that the crew manager's conduct
did not warrant the imposition of punitive damages.9 3 The appellate
court disagreed. The appellate court noted that punitive damages need
not arise from a tortfeasor's intent to cause injury but may, as here,
arise from inaction that exhibits a conscious disregard for the rights of
others.94 The crew manager's conduct, reasoned the court, may well
have caused irreparable injury to the appellee's reputation.9 5 The court
hinted that the appellant was abusing employees, many of whom were
inexperienced adolescents.96 Citing Levine, the court stressed the value
of the admonitory function of torts, accomplished through the imposition of punitive damages. 97
Much of the controversy surrounding punitive damages can be
traced to the term "punishment." 98 Indeed, punitive means punishment 99 and the most frequently cited goal of punitive damages is punishment."0 Some commentators, viewing punishment as the function of
criminal law and compensation as the function of tort law, reason that
punitive damages, because they punish, are anomalous to tort law.10 1
This reasoning fails to comprehend that punishment is entirely consistent with tort law. 102 Punishment effectuates deterrence,1 03 which is interrelated with the .admonitory function." 4 Because the admonitory
function is interrelated with tort law, punishment is, necessarily, consistent with tort law.' 0 5 The admonitory function of tort law is implicitly
embraced by those courts holding that punishment and deterrence are
the goals of punitive damages.1 06 The admonitory function evinces a

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Note,

260-61.
261.
261-62.
262-64.
262.
264.

263.
supra note 12, at 307, 331-32.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (5th ed. 1979).
Note, supra note 12, at 331-32.
Id. at 307-08, 331-32.
Id. at 331-32.
See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 643-49.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 648, 670.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531 (Fla.
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potpourri of legal goals, and of legal means by which those goals are
obtained. Specifically, the admonitory function of tort law is best defined as that function which attempts, through the most effective
means, to eliminate socially unacceptable conduct.1" 7 Reasoning that
punishment and punitive damages are inconsistent with tort law is a
misunderstanding of the admonitory function of tort law. 08 Compensation of injured plaintiffs is not the sole function of tort law. To the
contrary, tort law also discourages the unbridled conduct of defendants.
Punitive damages ensure the effectiveness of this discouragement.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Bad Faith Breach and Punitive Damages

The tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract developed
out of a jurisprudence committed to the alleviation of socially unacceptable conduct. 10 9 This development "shows that it is impossible fully
to eliminate moral responsibility as a fundamental basis for loss shifting," according to one commentator." 0 When insurance companies began to abuse their power and control, the courts created a tort theory
of recovery against this abuse."' This theory of recovery was uninhibited by the limitations of contract law." 2 Given that the tort of bad
faith breach was designed to combat intentional misconduct, the admonitory nature of this tort mandates that punitive damages be
available.
Even though the California Supreme Court did not award punitive
damages in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.," 3 this case is a part of an
early line of California cases that developed the tort of bad faith
breach, and laid the groundwork for the imposition of punitive damages.' 4 In Crisci, DiMare, a tenant in Crisci's apartment complex, fell
partially through the apartment's staircase." 5 DiMare was left suspended in the air."" She brought an action against Crisci, alleging that
1975); Linscott v. Rainier Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 857, 606 P.2d 958, 961 (1980);
Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 697, 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (1978); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment a (1977).
107. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 12, at 647 n.56. The most effective means of eliminating socially unacceptable conduct is that of punitive damages. Morris, supra note 12, at 117.
108. See Note, supra note 12, at 306-15.
109. Levine, supra note 7, at 615, 638.
110. Davis, Strict Liability or Liability Based upon Fault? Another Look, 10 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 5, 34 (1984).
Ill. K. ABRAHAM, supra note I, at 182-83; Levine, supra note 7, at 616.
112. See Levine, supra note 7, at 616-17.
113. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
116. Id.
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she developed a psychosis from the accident. 17 DiMare sought
$400,000 in compensatory damages."" Crisci had a $10,000 liability
insurance policy issued by Security Insurance Company.' 9
During the settlement negotiations, Security refused to settle with
DiMare for $9,000, even though Crisci offered to contribute $2,500.12
Psychiatrists, moreover, were prepared to testify that the accident
caused DiMare's psychosis.' 2 1 Consequently, a judgment was rendered
in favor of DiMare in the sum of $101,000.122 This caused Crisci, a
woman of advanced years, to become destitute, to suffer physical deterioration, and to attempt suicide.' 2 3 The California Supreme Court
awarded damages for mental distress in her action against Security,
reasoning that insurance provides the insured with "peace of mind and
security," interests that Security invaded. 4
Undoubtedly, the facts of Crisci demonstrate the utility of the admonitory function. The insurer had everything to gain and nothing to
lose by refusing to settle. For example, Crisci's insurance policy obligated her insurer to a liability limit of $10,000.125 If a judgment is
rendered against the insured for more than the policy limit, then the
insured is responsible for all sums above the policy limit, and the insurer's liability is still limited to the $10,000. The risk of an adverse
judgment falls most heavily upon the insured. The insurer in Crisci had
little chance of receiving a favorable jury verdict.'2 6 In short, the insurer's conduct ruined an elderly widow both mentally and financially. 2 7 The admonitory function of torts attempts to deter this flagrant abuse of insureds.
The California case that marked the recognition of first-party
claims, and the merger of the theories of third-party and first-party
claims, is Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. 2 In Gruenberg, a fire
destroyed the plaintiff insured's restaurant. 2 9 The restaurant was insured with three insurers, the defendants.13 0 Subsequently, the plaintiff

117.
118.

Id.

119.

Id. at 428, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
9 Cal.
Id. at

130.

Id.

428, 426 P.2d at
428, 426 P.2d at
428, 426 P.2d at
429, 426 P.2d at
433-34, 426 P.2d
428, 426 P.2d at
432, 426 P.2d at
433-34, 426 P.2d
3d 566, 575, 510
570, 510 P.2d at

175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973).
1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
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was charged with arson and insurance fraud.' The defendant insurers
demanded that the plaintiff submit to an examination under oath and
produce. certain relevant documentation of books of account, bills, invoices, and vouchers. 13 2 The plaintiff requested that the examination be
waived until the conclusion of the criminal charges. 13 3 The defendants
then denied liability under the plaintiff's insurance policies. 3 After the
criminal charges were dismissed, the plaintiff offered to submit to the
examination. 3 5 The insurers refused to comply and denied liability.1 36
Plaintiff filed suit. 37 The Gruenberg court stated:
It is manifest that a common legal principle underlies all of the foregoing
[third-party] decisions; namely, that in every insurance contract there is
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The duty to so act is
imminent in the contract whether the company is attending to the claims
of third persons against the insured or the claims of the insured itself.
Accordingly, when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds
payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort. 1 38
When the Ohio Supreme Court in Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,' 39 merged the theories of third-party and first-party claims,
the court followed the reasoning in Gruenberg.140 The Hoskins court
imposed upon insurers a legal "duty to act in good faith" toward their
insureds. 4 ' The Hoskins court premised an insurer's duty to act in
good faith upon the relationship between insurer and insured. 4 2 In
short, the matrix of the Hoskins decision is that insurers have a moral
and social responsibility toward their insureds.143 Morality is a concept
that is often disregarded in academic discussions concerning insurance
law. 44 Quoting Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Association, 45 the Hoskins court justified this new cause of action as follows:
The imposition of the duty of good faith upon the insurer is justified
because of the relationship between the ... [insurer and the insured] and

131. Id.
132. Id. at 570 n.2, 510 P.2d at 1034 n.2, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482 n.2.
133. Id. at 571, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
139. 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
140. Id. at 275-76, 452 N.E.2d at 1319.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 276, 452 N.E.2d at 1319.
143. See id. at 275-76, 452 N.E.2d at 1319-20.
144. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 5. See generally Levine, supra note 7.
145. 538 F.2d III (6th Cir. 1976).
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the fact that in the insurance field the insured. usually has no voice in the
preparation of the insurance policy and 'because of the great disparity
between the economic positions of the parties to a contract of insurance;
and furthermore, at the time an insured party makes a claim he may be
in dire financial straits and therefore may be especially vulnerable to
oppressive tactics by an insurer seeking a settlement or a release." '4"
The disparity in bargaining power between insurer and insured is
great. Insurers have utilized this disparity and the tragic occurrences in
the lives of their insureds to effectuate low settlements. This abuse of
power is seen in Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.14 7 In Neal, the
plaintiffs' decedent was seriously injured when an uninsured motorist
struck the vehicle in which she was a passenger.14 8 In effect at the time
of the accident was an insurance policy with Farmers, comprising
$15,000 in uninsured motorist coverage and $5,000 in medical payment
coverage.' 4 9 The Neals' attorney contacted Farmers to discuss a possible early payment under the policy.' 50 After three months, Farmers
made a $5,000 payment under the medical payment provision. 51
Farmers, however, refused to pay under the uninsured motorist provision.1 52 Farmers raised numerous arguments regarding why payment
under the uninsured motorist provision would not be made. 5 Farmers,
for example, claimed that the negligence of Mr. Neal, the driver of the
NealThe
vehicle, solely caused the accident.' 54
Neals, describing their burdened financial situation, fervently
requested Farmers to settle. The Neals offered to settle for $10,000,
reserving the right to dispute the other $5,000.'55 Without agreeing,
Farmers stated that the advice of their attorney would have to be
sought.15 Farmers' attorney reported to Farmers that its arguments for
not paying were weak.' 5 7 Farmers offered the Neals a $5,000 settlement.' 58 The $5,000 settlement being inadequate, the Neals countered
with their previous offer.' 59 Farmers never responded. 60

146. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 275, 452 N.E.2d at 1319 (quoting Battista, 538 F.2d at
118) (construing Ohio law).
147. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
148. Id. at 918, 582 P.2d at 983, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 918-19, 582 P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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The case was submitted to arbitration, where a decision in favor of
the Neals was rendered.161 Thereafter, the Neals filed a bad faith action against Farmers, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.1" 2
The Neals prevailed. 16 3 On appeal, the California Supreme Court held
that punitive damages were clearly appropriate."6 The court found
that the malicious, intentional conduct of Farmers was focused on the
grievous situation of the Neals in order to force a small settlement."6 5
It was exposed that this perverse treatment of insureds was company
policy, published in Farmers' "Claims Representative Field
1 66
Manual.11
0_ 7
Likewise, in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,
the
plaintiff insured sought damages against the defendant insurer for bad
faith breach of a disability insurance policy. 681 The plaintiff's policy
provided for monthly benefits in the event of total disability.'6 9 When
the plaintiff sought benefits for a disabling back injury, the defendant
refused to pay.' 7 0 The trial court held that the insurer's failure to sufficiently investigate the plaintiff's claim was a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.' 7 ' The jury awarded $5 million in punitive
damages, over forty times more than the compensatory award. 7 2 Although the California Supreme Court held the punitive damage award
excessive, it nevertheless recognized that insurance plays a vital role in
society and that punitive damages restore balance to the disparate bargaining positions between insurers and insureds. 17 1

160. Id.
161. Id. at 920, 582 P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
162. Id. at 917, 582 P.2d at 983, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 923 n.8, 582 P.2d at 987 n.8, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396 n.8. The Neal court stated:
Farmers' refusal to accept [an] offer of settlement, and its subsequent submission of the
matter to its attorney for opinion, were all part of a conscious course of conduct, firmly
grounded in established company policy, designed to utilize the lamentable circumstances
in which Mrs. Neal and her family found themselves, and the exigent financial situation
resulting from it, as a lever to force settlement more favorable to the company than the
facts would otherwise have warranted. The presence in the record of evidence to the contrary can be of no moment to this court for present purposes. Clearly, the record supports
an award of punitive damages against Farmers.
Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
167. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
168. Id. at 817, 598 P.2d at 455, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
169. Id. at 815, 598 P.2d at 454, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
170. Id. at 815-17, 598 P.2d at 454-55, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
171. Id. at 817, 598 P.2d at 455, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
172. Id. at 823-24, 598 P.2d at 459-60, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
173. Id. at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487. The Egan court noted that insurance is extremely important to insureds because it protects against tragedy. Id. at 819, 598 P.2d
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Neal and Egan illustrate how insurers use their superior bargaining power to force small settlements when insureds are at their lowest
financial ebb. Capitalizing on the grievous condition of insureds is not
favored in the law. It is ironic that insureds attempt to protect themselves by purchasing insurance and then find themselves at the mercy
of their insurance companies. 7 " The admonitory function of tort law
attempts to alleviate the abuse of insureds. But the admonitory function will cease to be effective if punitive damages are not available.
Neal and Egan are examples of the need for punitive damages.
Indeed, the common thread throughout all bad faith cases is the
need for punitive damages to deter socially reprehensible conduct. In
the context of bad faith breach, compensatory damages will not accomplish admonition. Professor Morris stated that a justification for the
continued existence of the doctrine "would be a demonstration of its
usefulness."'1 75 Utility, in turn, will best be illustrated through the outcomes of decisions.1 76 One writer has skillfully answered Professor
Morris' question by looking at the insurance industry's response to bad
faith claims and punitive damages. 77 The insurance industry has not
repented for prior misconduct, but has sounded a retreat, a "mere defensive effort[] to avoid punitive damages. 1 78 This response to bad
faith claims is evidence of the dire need to maintain the most effective

at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (citing Goodman & Seaton, Foreword. Ripe for Decision, Internal
Workings and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 309
(1974)). The Goodman and Seaton article emphasizes the importance of insurance and the resulting good faith required of insurer.
As to the disparity in bargaining power between insurer and insured, the Egan court stated,
"the relationship of insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced; the adhesive nature of insurance
contracts places the insurer in a superior bargaining position. The availability of punitive damages
is thus compatible with recognition of insurer's underlying public obligations and reflects an attempt to restore balance in the contractual relationship." Id. at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 487.
In effect, the Egan court identified the admonitory function perpetuated by punitive damages
in that punitive damages act as an equalizer between insurer and insured. Punitive damages are
the tool used to accomplish this goal. Although the Egan court did not expressly acknowledge the
admonitory function of punitive damages, the court implicitly outlined the admonitory function in
terms of the effect of punitive damages on the bargaining position between insurers and insureds.
The Egan court intimated that punitive damages equalize the bargaining positions of the insurer
and the insured. Id.
174. Note, Ohio. supra note 4, at 159.
175. Levine, supra note 7, at 614-15; Morris, supra note 12, at 1206. For insight into the
debates surrounding constitutional arguments and theories see Alexander, An Historical Perspective on the Constitution, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 321 (1986); Kerns, A Political Scientist's Perspective on the Constitution, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 341 (1986); Saphire, Some Reflections on
the Success and Failure of the Constitution, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 351 (1986).
176. Levine, supra note 7, at 614-15; Morris, supra note 12, at 1206.
177. Levine, supra note 7, at 621-27.
178. Id. at 626.
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means for perpetuating the admonitory function of torts-punitive
1 79
damages.
B. The Excessive Fines Clause as a ConstitutionalAttack Upon Punitive Damages
Of the three clauses in the eighth amendment,1 '80 the cruel and
unusual punishments clause has received the most discussion, 18 1 with
few criminal cases, 1s and. no civil cases, 83 being decided under the
excessive fines clause. The United States Supreme Court has suggested
that the entire eighth amendment applies only in the context of criminal law." 4 Therefore, the excessive fines clause, by implication, is often

179. Id. at 638.
180. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
181. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 -U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 238 (1972); Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
182. See, e.g., Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58 (1918); Badders v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833). But see BrowningFerris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2915 (interim ed. 1989).
183. Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1717 (1987). But see Browning-Ferris Indus.
of Vermont, Inc.. 109 S. Ct. at 2915.
184. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). Ingraham stands for the proposition
that the eighth amendment applies in the context of criminal law. Id. The Ingraham Court conceded that "[slome punishments, though not labeled 'criminal' by the State, may be sufficiently
analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are administered to justify
application of the [e]ighth [a]mendment." Id. at 669 n.37. The punishment would seemingly have
to be extremely analogous to traditional criminal punishments, for example, confinement in a
mental or juvenile institution. Id. As an example of a punishment sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments, the Court cited In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1987), where a minor was committed as
a juvenile delinquent to a state institution. Id.
The Ingraham dissent, written by Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, adopted a "purposive approach" to the scope of the eighth amendment. Id. at 688
(White, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority, the dissent embraced a broad approach to the ambit
of the amendment. Id. at 684-92. The dissent illustrated this broad principled approach to interpreting the amendment in the following manner:
The issue in this case is whether spankings inflicted on public school children for breaking
school rules is "punishment," not whether such punishment is "cruel and unusual." If the
eighth amendment does not ban moderate spanking in public schools, it is because moderate spanking is not "cruel and unusual", not because it is not "punishment" as the majority
suggests.
Id. at 685 n.l.
In support of this "purposive approach," the dissent relied on Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958) (plurality opinion), where the petitioner, a native-born American citizen, was convicted
under a general court martial for desertion and was then dishonorably discharged. Id. at 87-88.
Subsequently, the petitioner applied for a passport. Id. at 88. The petitioner was denied a passport
because he had lost his citizenship pursuant to the Nationality Act of 1940. Id. The petitioner
instituted a declaratory judgement action, seeking a declaration that he was an American citizen.
id.
Chief Justice Warren, in Trop, recognized that "[tihe basic concept underlying the [e]ighth
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thought of as being applicable only in the criminal context. 8 But this
approach is not without controversy. To be sure, the controversy centers on the history of the eighth amendment.
The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." '8 6 The Court has in at least two instances interpreted
this amendment.1 87 In Ingraham v. Wright,'8 8 the petitioners, two junior high school students, brought an action against certain school officials for injuries they sustained from receiving corporal punishment.' 89
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment does not apply to corporal punishment in public schools.' 90 The clause, it was held, applies. only to
criminal punishments. 19' In so holding, the Court seemed to say that
the entire eighth amendment applies solely to the criminal context:
Bail, fines, and punishment traditionally have been associated with the
criminal process, and by subjecting the three to parallel limitations the

[a]mendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id. at 100. Conceding that the state can
impose punishment, Chief Justice Warren reasoned that fines, imprisonment, and death may be
proportionate to the crime; but the particular punishment must not diverge from the limits of
societal norms. Id. The Trop Court did not view the amendment as static, rather the Court viewed
the amendment as adaptable to the changes in society. Id. at 100-01. Thus, a strict compliance
with the history of the amendment would not displace the amendment's application in a changing
society, where constitutional norms must adapt and change to function properly. Id. at 101.
The Trop Court, however, still linked the eighth amendment to criminal punishment, but
adopted a less rigid standard than the Ingraham Court. Id. at 96-101. The Trop Court acknowledged that if a punishment was penal in nature, it would fall within the proscriptions of the eighth
amendment. Id. at 96.
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based its determination
upon the purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of
punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc. - it has been considered penal. But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to
punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose.
Id.
Ingraham and Trop appear to conflict. In fact, the broad purposive approach articulated in
Trop was not followed in Ingraham. Nevertheless, there is also consistency between Ingraham and
Trop. Both cases require penal attributes in a sanction in order to invoke the eighth amendment.
From Ingraham there emerges the requirement that if a sanction is to fall within the ambit of the
eighth amendment, the sanction must be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments. Asking
whether a sanction is sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments is simply asking whether the
sanction is penal. Thus, if punitive damages are to be scrutinized under the excessive fines clause
of the eighth amendment, they must be sufficiently penal in nature.
185. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1987); Note, supra note 183, at 1706.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. Vill.
187. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
188. 430 U.S. 65i (1977).
189. Id. at 653-54.
190. Id. at 671.
191. Id. at 664.
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text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those
entrusted with the criminal-law function of government. An examination
of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that
it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes.1 92
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Ingraham, began his
analysis of the eighth amendment from a textual standpoint. 193 Justice
Powell noted that the plain meaning of the amendment suggests a
criminal connotation. 194 Justice Powell then began an historical approach to ascertaining the scope of the amendment. 195 As most historians will agree, the American Bill of Rights was adopted from the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which, in turn, was adopted from
the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.191 Likewise, Justice Powell
found that the text of the amendment was taken practically verbatim
from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was obtained from the
English version.197
The backdrop to the English Declaration of Rights was the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89.118 According to Justice Powell, the English
version of the eighth amendment, adopted after the accession of William and Mary, exhibited an effort to restrain the overbearing English
judges under James 11.199 After James II fled England, the final draft
of the Declaration of Rights was introduced in the House of Commons.2 ° Basically, the Declaration of Rights was a restatement of established rights and a declaration of new rights.2 1 The Declaration's
provisions were strongly influenced by the Magna Carta of 1215.202
The object of the English version, noted Justice Powell, "was the conduct of judges in enforcing the criminal law." 2 0 3 Article ten of the Declaration concerned excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punish-

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.; see generally GRIGSBY, THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1776 (1855); Massey,
supra note 185, at 1240. The fact that the American Bill of Rights was adopted from the English
Declaration of Rights indicates that the Founding Fathers demanded the same rights as those
afforded to Englishmen. "[T]heir use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing
proof that they intended to provide at least the same protection - including the rights to be free
from excessive punishments." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983).
197. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
198. Massey, supra note 185, at 1243.
199. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
200. Id. at 664-65; see also Massey, supra note 185, at 1243-49.
201. Massey, supra note 185, at 1243.
202. Id. at 1251-52; Note, supra note 183, at 1714.
203. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 665.
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ments.20 4 For Justice Powell, the elimination of the reference to
"criminal cases" from the final draft of the Declaration-though present in the first-was an inconsequential event." 5 Relying on Blackstone, Justice Powell asserted that the clauses of article ten dealt with
criminal law, and likewise, the eighth amendment is concerned with
criminal law.2 06
One commentator has taken an opposite view of the elimination of
"4criminal cases" from the final draft of the Declaration of Rights." 7
To understand this position, the distinction between "amercements"
and "fines" must be considered. 0 At the time of the Magna Carta, an
amercement was a monetary penalty to be paid to the crown for civil or
criminal misconduct. 09 According to the Magna Carta, juries assessed
amercements 10 Because medieval judges could not impose fines, they
would imprison offenders. 1' The fine, then, became a voluntary bargain made with the judge and payable to the king in lieu of imprisonment.2" 2 When fines ceased to be voluntary, the amercement eventually
became obsolete. 13 Thus, reasons this commentator, "[a]rticle ten explicitly addressed the issue of fines, while it implicitly reaffirmed ancient rights with respect to amercements. The Declaration of Rights'
excessive fines clause thus should be read as simultaneously prohibiting
excessive fines and amercements, whether imposed by judge or jury, in
both civil and criminal proceedings."2 4 This commentator and others
argue that the excessive fines clause should apply to punitive damages
in civil cases between private parties.2" 5

204. Id. at 665; Massey, supra note 185, at 1252.
205. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 665.
206. Id. For a critical review of Justice Powell's reading of Blackstone, see Massey, supra
note 185, at 1256 n.131.
207. Id. at 1256.
208. See id. at 1259-69.
209. 2 F.POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 513-15 (2d ed. 1968);
Massey, supra note 185, at 1259-61; Note, supra note 183, at 1714-15.
There was always a plaintiff, whether in the action for a tort or the prosecution for an
offense. In the latter he was called the prosecution. If he failed to prove his case, whether
civil or criminal, he was subject to amercement pro falso clamore, while if he succeeded,
the defendant was in misericordia.See Comm. v. Johnson, 5 S. & R. (Pa.) 195, 198 [sic];
Musser v. Good, II Id. 247 [sic]. Thus in the outcome someone would be amerced in every
case, and the amercements generally went to the Crown, and the fund was considerable.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 525 (1926).
210. Massey, supra note 185, at 1262; Note, supra note 183, at 1715; see also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 209, at 513.
211. Massey, supra note 185, at 1261-62; Note, supra note 183, at 1715.
212. Note, supra note 183, at 1715.
213. Id.
214. Massey, supra note 185, at 1256.
215. Id.
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In Solem v. Helm,216 the United States Supreme Court briefly
outlined some historical aspects of the eighth amendment and, more
specifically, identified the principle of proportionality which underlies
the amendment." 7 "When. the Framers of the eighth amendment
adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights, they also adopted
the English principle of proportionality .. ,"'s The principle of proportionality is synonymous with a prohibition of excessive punishment.
History is inconclusive on the scope of the excessive fines clause.2 19
Depending on the authority, valid arguments can be made in support of
the proposition that punitive damages in civil actions at the time of the
English Bill of Rights were unknown, or that punitive damages of today would have encompassed statutory multiple damages which were
quite common as far back as the Code of Hammurabi 2 When the
first Congress met to debate the proposed constitutional amendments,
there was little discussion over the excessive fines clause. 2 ' Debate,
however, did arise over whether the cruel and unusual punishments
clause would eliminate certain criminal punishments. 2 2 The congressional silence on the eighth amendment demonstrates, if anything, an
unquestioned acceptance of an amendment, which, to the Framers, contained at least some limitations upon certain criminal punishments. 2 3
Whether the Framers contemplated punitive damages in civil actions
between private parties is highly speculative. Unlike modern punitive
damage awards, amercements did not go to private parties;22 amercements went to the crown.22 5 History is a guide to constitutional interpretation. 22' However, stretching history, with all its uncertainties, so
as to embrace punitive damages within the excessive fines clause may
be stretching things too far.
The United States Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris Industries
of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 227 after an exhaustive discus-

216. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
217. Id. at 284-85.
218. Id. at 285-86.
219. Cf Massey, supra note 185, at 1274-75; Note, supra note 183, at 1718-19.
220. See Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL 50 (Nov., 1978).
221. Massey, supra note 185, at 1241.
222. "When the eighth amendment was debated in the First Congress, it was met by the
objection that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause might have the effect of outlawing
what were then the common criminal punishments of hanging, whipping and earcropping." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977) (citing I Annals of Cong. 74 (1789)); see also Massey,
supra note 185, at 1241.
223. Contra Massey, supra note 185, at 1241.
224. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 525 (1926).
225. Id.
226. See generally Powell, Rules for Originalists,73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987).
227. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (interim ed. 1989).

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:3

sion of English history, concluded that the excessive fines clause of the
eighth amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards in cases
between private parties. 22 8 The Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, stated that the history of the eighth amendment demonstrates
that the excessive fines clause "was intended to limit only those fines
directly imposed by, and payable to, the government. ' 22 9 The Court
was not persuaded by the inconclusive history of the excessive fines
clause. 2 0 To the Court, the purpose of the eighth amendment is to constrain the actions that a government may take against an individual.23 '
Justice O'Connor,. concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with the majority's analysis of English history.2 32 Justice
O'Connor stated "[t]here is... considerable historical support for application of the Excessive Fines Clause to punitive damages."233 But
Justice O'Connor did not base her arguments solely on English history.23 4 Instead, she reasoned that punitive damages further the goals
of criminal law.23 5 In fact, Justice O'Connor stated that punitive damages are anomalous to tort law's traditional function of reparation.230
She viewed punitive damages as penal in nature.13 7 Thus, according to
Justice O'Connor, punitive damages should be scrutinized under the
excessive fines clause because of their penal nature.23 8 For determining
whether punitive damages are penalties, Justice O'Connor relied on the
240
239
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez seven-factor test:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3]
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in
21
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.

228. Id. at 2912.
229.
230.
231.
232.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 2916.
Id. at 2916-19.
Id. at 2920.
Id. at 2924.
Id. at 2931.
Id.
Id. at 2932.
Id.
Id.
Id..
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2932.
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
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Justice O'Connor agreed with those commentators who have concluded that punitive damages are penal under the Kennedy factors.2 42
Upon closer examination, this conclusion may be suspect.
The two United States Supreme Court cases that developed a constitutional framework for determining penalty are United States v.
Ward2" and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.2" In Ward, the respondent had violated Section 311(b)(3) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA),2 4 5 prohibiting the discharge of oil into navigable waters. 2" Section 311(b)(5) of the FWPCA requires those with
knowledge of violations to report them to the appropriate governmental
agency, and making the failure to report the violations a crime.2 47 Respondent reported the discharge and the Coast Guard assessed a civil
penalty against respondent.2 48 Respondent filed suit, seeking to enjoin
enforcement because the FWPCA reporting requirement violated his
fifth amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. 4 9 One of
the issues facing the Court was whether the statutorily defined civil
penalty should be treated as a criminal penalty for purposes of the appropriate constitutional safeguards concerned with criminal law. 25
The Ward Court developed a two-step procedure. First, the Court
examines the label Congress attached to the statutorily defined penalty.25 Second, once the label has been ascertained, the Court inquires
whether the "purpose or effect" of the statutory-scheme is so punitive
that it contradicts the civil label.2 52 The "purpose or effect" is to be
determined under the comprehensive seven-factor analysis outlined in
25 3
Kennedy.
In Kennedy, the appellee, a native-born American, left the United
States to evade military service in time of war.2 54 Thereafter, appellee
returned to the United States. 55 After serving a sentence of imprisonment for evasion of his military duty, deportation proceedings were
brought against him, pursuant to Section 401(j) of the Nationality Act

242. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2932; see Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive
Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 241 (1985).
243. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
244. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
245. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1976).
246. Ward, 448 U.S. at 246.
247. Id. at 244.
248. Id. at 246-47.
249. Id. at 247-48.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 248.
252. Id. at 248-49.
253. Id. at 249-50.
254. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 147.
255. Id.
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of 1940.126 The appellee sought a declaratory judgment regarding his
right to citizenship, the unconstitutionality of Section 401(j), and upon
the voidness of the orders to deport him.2 57 To determine whether a
sanction is penal in nature and therefore requires the constitutional
safeguards of the fifth and sixth amendments, the Court in Kennedy
developed the comprehensive, though not exhaustive, seven-factor
test.2 58
Besides establishing the two-step inquiry for determining the effect
of the sanction, the Ward Court applied the necessary criteria for evaluating the penalty. The standard of proof for establishing a penalty is
the clearest proof.2 59 Additionally, because the Kennedy factors are, for
the most part, the relevant test in determining the criminal or penal
nature of a sanction, the clearest proof standard is a limitation on those
factors. The Ward Court, moreover, stated that the Kennedy factors
are "neither exhaustive nor conclusive."2 The Court showed a willingness to bifurcate the factors, making it possible that any one factor, or
no factors, may be dispositive.2 1l
The first factor concerns whether a punitive damage award against
a defendant invokes an affirmative disability or restraint upon that defendant.2 62 If it does, this factor supports a finding that the award is
penal.26 3 The Kennedy Court cited three cases as examples of affirmative disabilities or restraints. 2 4 From the cases cited, it is clear that
punitive damages do not involve the type of disability or restraint contemplated in Kennedy. The first case cited was Ex parte Garland265
where the petitioner, an attorney, had received a presidential pardon
for prior activities with the Confederate government, but nevertheless
was permanently excluded from the practice of law in federal court.26 6
The Court held that petitioner's exclusion from the practice of law was
an invalid punishment under the Constitution.2 67 In the second case

256. Id. at 148.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 158-69.
259. Id. It must be emphasized that the Kennedy Court uses the term "punishment" as
synonymous with "penal" or "criminal." However, in Ingraham Justice Powell differentiates between "punishments" and "criminal punishments," defining criminal punishments as punishments
that are penal in nature. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37.
260. Ward, 448 U.S. at 250.
261. Id.
262. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 168 (citing Flemming v. Nestor', 363 U.S. 603 (1960); United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)).
265. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
266. Id. at 375-76.
267. Id. at 381.
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cited, United States v. Lovett,2 68 it was held that a legislative act which
prohibited certain named individuals-"subversives"-from government service is a severe punishment." 9 The Court stated that this type
of punishment is usually invoked for the crime of treason. 70 In Fleming v. Nestor,17 1 the third case cited by the Kennedy Court, it was held
that the termination of appellee's noncontractual governmental benefits
under the Social Security Act imposes no affirmative disability or restraint.2 72 The Court considered the denial of Social Security benefits
inconsequential compared to deprivations such as stripping a person of
his career or imposing a sentence of imprisonment. 73
Punitive damages are not an affirmative disability or restraint. 7 4
The Kennedy Court was precise in choosing examples for the first factor. Ex parte Garland and Lovett were cases in which the sanction
affirmatively disabled the recipient.27 5 Justice Black, writing for the
majority in Lovett, stated that a "permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and of a most severe
type. ' 27 6 Likewise, the California Supreme Court in Peterson v. Superior Court, 7 remarked: "The potential punitive damages award in this
case is unquestionably a penalty civil in nature. There is no possibility
of the stigma of a criminal conviction nor the potential loss of personal
freedom.' ' 278 In order for a sanction to fall within the first Kennedy
factor, the sanction must permanently disable the recipient. In the context of punitive damages, theoretically, the defendant is not permanently disabled.
Just as punitive damages fail to meet the first Kennedy factor,
they also fail to meet the second factor, which asks whether the sanction has historically been regarded as punishment. 79 Of the four cases
cited by the Kennedy Court regarding this factor, three concerned "in-

268. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
269. Id. at 305-16.
270. Id. at 316. "This permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and of a most severe type. It is a type of punishment which Congress has only
invoked for special types of odious and dangerous crimes.
...
Id.
271. 363 U.S. at 603 (1960).
272. Id. at 605-20.
273. "Here the sanction is the mere denial of a noncontractual government benefit." Id. at
617.
274. Contra Grass, supra note 242, at 249.
275. In both cases the sanctions stripped the recipients of their careers. Accordingly, the
recipients would be forever burdened and stigmatized.
276. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316.
277. 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982).
278. Id. at 161, 642 P.2d at 1313, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
279. Kennedy, 373 U.S. at 168.
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famous punishments." 2 80 For example, in Ex parte Wilson,2 81 the petitioner had been fined and imprisoned for fifteen years at hard labor for
forgery. 2 ' The Court held that imprisonment at hard labor is an infamous punishment.2 3 Also, in Mackin v. United States,2" 4 the Court
held that imprisonment in a state prison is an infamous punishment. 8 5
In Wong Wing v. United States,2 81 the issue before the Court was
whether a commissioner, without an indictment or trial by jury, could
lawfully convict and sentence an alien to imprisonment at hard labor
for being unlawfully within the United States.28 7 Again, the Court held
that imprisonment at hard labor is an infamous punishment.288
The imposition of punitive damages is not "infamous punishment."28 9 One commentator concedes that, historically, punitive damages were nonpenal sanctions, assessed by English jurors who were
neighbors and acquaintances of the defendant.2 90 But this commentator
argues that because punitive damages are randomly inflicted and impossible to calculate, they could be considered "infamous." 29' 1 This
commentator attempts to equate frequent awards of punitive damages
with the severe punishments imposed in Ex parte Wilson,2 9 Mackin,29
and Wong Wing.2 94 Punitive damages, however, are incomparable with
imprisonment at hard labor. To attempt a comparison of punitive damages with imprisonment borders on the absurd. They are fundamentally
different.
The third Kennedy factor is whether the penalty comes into play
only upon a finding of scienter. Although in most cases, scienter is required before punitive damages are awarded, the court in Richards Co.

280. The Court cited: Wong-Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Mackin v.
United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886); Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). Kennedy, 373 U.S. at 332. In Cummings, the only case cited
by the Kennedy court which did not deal with the "infamous punishment," the Cummings court
examined an oath which prevented a priest from teaching and preaching. The oath was held to be
a punishment. Id. Although the Cummings Court was not confronted with an infamous punishment, the punishment was still of great magnitude.
281. 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
282. Id. at 418.
283. Id. at 427-29.
284. 117 U.S. 348 (1886).
285. Id. at 351-55.
286. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
287. Id. at 235, 241.
288. Id. at 237.
289. Grass, supra note 242, at 256.
290. Id. at 256-57.
291. Id. at 257.
292. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
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2 95 held
v. Harrison
that punitive damages need not arise from a
tortfeasor's intent to cause injury."" Admittedly, however, scienter is
required to recover punitive damages in bad faith litigation.
The fourth Kennedy factor, concerning whether the sanction's imposition will promote retribution and deterrence,2 97 does not apply to
punitive damages. Deterrence is the aim of both criminal and tort
law.298 Deterrence is thus an empty differentiation. 9 9 Likewise, the
Court in Browning-Ferris reasoned: "While we agree with petitioners
that punitive damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also among the interests advanced by the criminal
law, we fail to see how this overlap requires us to apply the Excessive
Fines Clause in a case between private parties." 00 As an example of
retribution, the Kennedy Court cited Trop v. Dulles.30 1 In Trop, the
petitioner lost his citizenship for desertion.30 2 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan equated expatriation with "naked vengeance. 30 3 Punitive damages are not "naked vengeance." Punitive damages are a tool
by which admonition can be effectuated. Therefore, punitive damages
do not fall under the fourth Kennedy factor.
The fifth factor focuses on the conduct to which the sanction is
applied to determine whether the behavior is already a crime. 0 4 To
illustrate the criminal nature of the conduct, the Court cited three
3 0 5 United
cases, United States v. Constantine,
States v. LaFranca,30 6
3
and Lipke v. Lederer."' The Court reasoned that even though all
three cases dealt with predicate crimes, the fifth factor was still satisfied. 30 8 Bad faith breach of an insurance contract is not a crime. Bad
faith breach arises from the tortious breach of a contract; there is no
30 9
predicate crime.
In regard to the sixth and seventh Kennedy factors, it must be
asked whether punitive damages serve an alternative nonpenal purpose,
and whether the sanction is excessive in the light of that alternative

295. 262 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
296. Id. at 262.
297. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
298. Note, supra note 12, at 337.
299. Id. at 334-37.
300. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2920.
301. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
302. Id. at 88.
303. Id. at 112 (J. Brennan, concurring).
304. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
305. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
306. 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
307. 259 U.S. 557 (1922); see Grass, supra note 242, at 293.
308. See Grass, supra note 242, at 293.
309. Cf. Note, supra note 183, at 1722.
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purpose. 31 The purpose of punitive damages is to effectuate the admonitory function of tort law.3 11 Accordingly, punitive damages are a
useful tool in making sure the admonitory function can operate
properly.
This alternative purpose can be illustrated by the skewed cost/
benefit analysis that results from the threat of punitive damages.3 12
Suppose X Corporation spends $5 million per year manufacturifig a
product which it knows will cause serious injuries to consumers. The
defectively designed product will yield $40 million in yearly profits.
Thereafter, X corporation, through research, concludes that an alternative, safer design would cost the corporation $20 million per year to
manufacture and would not increase profits. Further, X Corporation
determines that liability for personal injuries resulting from the present
design will amount to $5 million in compensatory damages, and that if
the present design is put into the marketplace, the publicity from the
anticipated litigation will be minimal. What is to stop X Corporation
from placing the present design into the marketplace? By not manufacturing the alternative design, X Corporation makes $10 million more in
yearly profits.
To quote Milton Friedman, "there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the
game. ' ' 313 Milton Friedman intimates that the above hypothetical is appropriate conduct according to business standards. Because X Corporation will pay damages, it has, essentially, stayed within the "rules of
the game." Yet if the "rules of the game" include punitive damages,
the above scenario is unlikely to occur.
Bad faith litigation demands that punitive damages be available.
Insurance companies will, at times, breach their insurance contracts
and profit as a result. In fact, insureds are usually helpless to prevent
this abuse. In Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance Co.," 4 for example, the
plaintiff insured was seriously injured in an automobile accident with
an uninsured motorist.31 5 The uninsured motorist offered to settle with
the plaintiff for $5,000.31 The plaintiff, pursuant to her insurance contract, could not accept the settlement offer without the written consent

310. Kennedy. 372 U.S. at 168-69.
311. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
312. See Note, supra note 12, at 330-31 (commentator evaluates punitive damages in terms
of the effect of punitive damages on a cost/benefit analysis).
313. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
314. 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980).
315. Id. at 319.
316. Id.
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of her insurer, Hanover. 17 Hanover, being aware of plaintiff's financial
and physical difficulties, made the consent conditional upon plaintiff's
acceptance of a small settlement of her claims against Hanover. 18 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized an independent cause of action in tort for bad faith breach, 319 and acknowledged the limitations of
contractual theories upon unscrupulous insurers.3 2 0 Moreover, noted the
Bibeault court, a recovery under contractual theories will preclude exposing the insurer to punitive damages.3 21 The court stated:
In this atmosphere, insurers, backed by sufficient financial resources, are
encouraged to delay payment of claims to their insureds with an eye
toward settling for a lesser amount than that due under the policy. The
potential loss could never exceed the contract amount plus interest. Thus,
when the legal rate of interest is lower than the commercial rate, an
unscrupulous insurer would be wise to delay payment for the maximum
period of time. The inequity of this situation becomes particularly apparent in the area of disability insurance in which the insured, often pursued
by creditors and devoid of bargaining power, may easily be persuaded to
settle for an amount substantially lower than that provided for in the
3 22
insurance contract.
The Bibeault case illustrates that the alternative purpose of punitive damages is to further admonition in order to curtail socially unacceptable conduct. The theories of contract law, in some instances, may
make it profitable for an insurance company to breach an insurance
contract. The threat of punitive damages, however, is a strong deterrent
to the calculated breach of an insurance contract.
As a result, the seventh Kennedy factor, whether the sanction is
excessive in the light of its alternative purpose, 2 3 is answered in the
negative. To hold that punitive damages are excessive, given that their
alternative purpose is to perpetuate admonition, is a contradiction. It is
their excessive nature that creates their alternative purpose.
Justice O'Connor appeared to be willing to sacrifice the admonitory function of torts for misguided arguments against punitive damages.324 Justice O'Connor reasoned: "The threat of such enormous
awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of
new products. Some manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example,

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Kennedy, 373 U.S. at 168.
Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2932.
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have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market." '2 5
But this reasoning misses the mark. Punitive damages act as a
check on the careless manufacturing of unsafe products. Similarly, punitive damages deter insurers from breaching their insurance contracts
with helpless insureds. Does society want manufacturers to scrutinize
the safety of their products? Does society want insurance companies to
treat insureds with dignity? Punitive damages stop socially hazardous
conduct. In effect, the Browning-Ferris majority preserved punitive
damages and the admonitory function of tort law. 2
IV.

CONCLUSION

Punitive damages are a necessary part of our jurisprudence. They
are vital in perpetuating the admonitory function of tort law. In fact,
the concept of punitive damages is the greatest invention of law for
eliminating tortious conduct. The reprehensible conduct of insurers can
only be stayed by the threat of large monetary damages. Although insurers have rallied to obtain constitutional protection, the excessive
fines clause of the eighth amendment does not apply to an award of
7
punitive damages in civil actions between private parties.3 2 With an
inconclusive history, the excessive fines clause applies only in the context of criminal law. Bad faith breach of an insurance contract, to be
sure, is a serious tort. It is used by insurance companies to abuse helpless insureds. Punitive damages stop such abuse.
Gary Drew Plunkett
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 2912.
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